In a comment on Ben Bayer’s recent post about the NDPR review of Sanford’s Before Virtue, an anonymous person asks about the distinction between the consequentialist and teleological ethics.
The following comments on this post are preserved:
*Chris C. asks:* I have access to the Companion but perhaps you could state in brief for general readers how you differentiate Rand's egoism from eudaimonism? The interpretation (among scholars learned in this area) of Rand as a eudaimonist is rather widespread, and I thought Tara Smith was among those interpreters. (There is also Peikoff's positive mention of Aristotle in connection with his regarding "eudaimonia as the human entelechy" toward the end of ch. 9 of OPAR....)
Greg S. replies: "Eudaimonism holds that what a person should do always coincides with her self‐interest, but is ambiguous whether eudaimonism is a form of egoism, because it is not clear that, according to eudaimonism, this is the reason why the person should take the action. Ethical egoism is the thesis that what makes an action moral (or virtuous) is that it benefi ts the agent; whereas, according to eudaimonism, it is the virtuousness of an action that makes it part of eudaimonia and thus good for the agent. What then makes it virtuous? If an answer is given in terms of the agent’s welfare, then eudaimonism would be a form of egoism; but eudaimonists generally define the virtues by appealing to standards of rightness or nobility that are not (at least, not obviously) based on the agent’s welfare.
"Rand identifies the standard of value as “man’s life” and has a demanding and exalted conception of the life “proper to man” (“The Objectivist Ethics” VOS 25–27). This has led some commentators to interpret her as a eudaimonist. This is not an implausible interpretation of Rand’s thought in the 1930s and 1940s, but it is not accurate for Rand’s mature view. As Gotthelf and I each discuss in earlier chapters (see 60–61, 66–68, and 91–92), Atlas Shrugged and Rand’s subsequent essays present virtue neither as intrinsically good nor as an instrument by which one maximizes some such good as pleasure, desire‐satisfaction, or longevity. Rand recognized a third alternative: the moral values and virtues are essential constituents of the ultimate end that is a person’s life, and they owe their status as constituents to the causal contribution they make to the sustenance of this life. On her view, there are no values apart from an individual’s ultimate value of his own life, and a person’s life is made up of the values and activities by which he sustains himself." (Companion 134–135)
See also Allan Gotthelf's discussion (p. 91) on the use of the words "flourishing" and "eudaimonia" to describe what Rand sees as the ultimate end. I don't think it's wrong to use these words, but it can certainly be misleading, insofar as it can lead people to assimilate her more closely to the Aristotelian tradition than her texts bear out (not withstanding the profound similarities that there are between her and this tradition).
Darryl W. replies: Some very quick thoughts on this valuable post:
I agree that there is an egoistic analogue of consequentialism. But I would draw the distinction between that kind of egoism and Rand’s (and, more generally, between Rand’s view and consequentialism) somewhat differently.
Consequentialism is primarily a theory of the right, and I think Rawls’ characterization in A Theory of Justice of what were at that time usually called “teleological” theories (and are now called “consequentialist”) is apt as a characterization of consequentialism. (On another thread, there was discussion of the contrast between consequentialism and other theories that might be called “teleological” but not “consequentialist,” using the former term in a different way than Rawls did. I agree that there is such a distinction, and that it’s important. I’m restricting myself here only to consequentialist theories.)
On Rawls’s characterization, consequentialism holds that the good is prior to the right and that the right is what maximizes the good. Rawls went on to characterize deontological theories as those which deny one or both of these claims, and I think that’s a mistake—since it’s not the case that views denying one or both of these claims belong together in any narrower category than “moral theories” or “theories of the right.” But I do think that it should be considered a defining characteristic of consequentialist theories that they take the right to consist in the maximization of the good and take it that the good, in whatever sense matters for the theory of right, can be defined prior to and independently of the right.
Though it’s true that Rand’s view of welfare links welfare to an agent’s actions, it would be possible to have a consequentialist theory that did this also. For example, very simply, if not very plausibly, welfare could be understood as an agent’s active pursuit and achievement of desired ends. If one took this to have value in itself, one could define either an egoistic or an impartialistic form of consequentialism based on this account of welfare. On this view, the good would still be prior to the right, even though the agent’s welfare would not be independent of his actions.
(On an egoistic variant of this view, an argument for justice as a moral requirement would be along the following lines: that, e.g., repaying one’s debts was necessary as part of a process of actively pursuing and achieving one’s desired ends. The good consequences would not be seen as wholly independent of the just act, but the priority of the good would have been maintained, since you wouldn’t have needed to mention justice to conceive of the end by reference to which justice was evaluated as right or required. I’m not recommending this view, but just saying that it preserves the essential structure of consequentialism as far as I can see, whereas on Rand’s view nothing that avoids reference to moral norms will be adequate as an account of an individual’s welfare, since an individual’s welfare critically involves how he makes certain moral choices.)
As I see it, Rand’s view differs from consequentialism not primary in linking welfare with action, though that’s an indispensable part of her position, or in not separating right action from the values it achieves, but in denying the priority of the good over the right.
(Related to this, Rand denies that there is such a thing as “nonmoral value” by which to anchor the consequentialist evaluation of actions. In most forms of consequentialism, the sort of value on which action-evaluation is based is regarded as non-moral, although that’s not essential to consequentialism or to the thesis of the priority of the right.)
What differentiates Rand’s view from consequentialism is that her account of human good is, at the same time, an account of the right, or, more properly, of morality—of moral value and virtue. She doesn’t hold, with Kant, that the right is prior to the good, but that, at the most fundamental level, in characterizing human good and thus human welfare we are at the same delineating basic moral principles. Fundamentally, she sees human good as requiring certain kinds of basic choices, and it is in being confronted by the need to make these choices (e.g., between rationality and irrationality, or purpose or purposelessness) that we are confronted by distinctively “moral" issues.
I think that Greg’s brief characterization of Rand’s view adverts to, or at least leaves room for recognizing, this contrast between her view and consequentialism. I’m thinking specifically of his reference to rationality. On Rand’s view, rationality is a moral virtue, and an all-encompassing one, so to say that an individual’s welfare consists in the rational achievement of a certain kind of life is to say that morality is integral to one’s achievement of one’s welfare.
(Part of why Rand doesn’t hold that the right is prior to the good is that she holds a teleological view of the good. Delineating both goodness and rightness, values and virtues, is a teleological enterprise and, properly understood, the same enterprise. In saying that it’s a teleological enterprise, I mean very roughly that it involves exploring the structure of goal-directed action.)
On some views, rationality is a pre-moral concept to be understood in terms of consistency and/or informational adequacy, or what have you. A moral theory that built a rationality constraint into its conception of welfare, but conceived of rationality independently from morality, could still be a consequentialist view, if it also held that the right is maximization of welfare (either for the agent or for everyone).
So, to summarize, what seems crucial to me in differentiating Rand’s position from consequentialism (and—though this is for another time—from deontology) is her view of the relation between morality and individual welfare and not just her view of the relation between the latter and an agent’s action.
The following comments on this post are preserved:
*Chris C. asks:* I have access to the Companion but perhaps you could state in brief for general readers how you differentiate Rand's egoism from eudaimonism? The interpretation (among scholars learned in this area) of Rand as a eudaimonist is rather widespread, and I thought Tara Smith was among those interpreters. (There is also Peikoff's positive mention of Aristotle in connection with his regarding "eudaimonia as the human entelechy" toward the end of ch. 9 of OPAR....)
Greg S. replies: "Eudaimonism holds that what a person should do always coincides with her self‐interest, but is ambiguous whether eudaimonism is a form of egoism, because it is not clear that, according to eudaimonism, this is the reason why the person should take the action. Ethical egoism is the thesis that what makes an action moral (or virtuous) is that it benefi ts the agent; whereas, according to eudaimonism, it is the virtuousness of an action that makes it part of eudaimonia and thus good for the agent. What then makes it virtuous? If an answer is given in terms of the agent’s welfare, then eudaimonism would be a form of egoism; but eudaimonists generally define the virtues by appealing to standards of rightness or nobility that are not (at least, not obviously) based on the agent’s welfare.
"Rand identifies the standard of value as “man’s life” and has a demanding and exalted conception of the life “proper to man” (“The Objectivist Ethics” VOS 25–27). This has led some commentators to interpret her as a eudaimonist. This is not an implausible interpretation of Rand’s thought in the 1930s and 1940s, but it is not accurate for Rand’s mature view. As Gotthelf and I each discuss in earlier chapters (see 60–61, 66–68, and 91–92), Atlas Shrugged and Rand’s subsequent essays present virtue neither as intrinsically good nor as an instrument by which one maximizes some such good as pleasure, desire‐satisfaction, or longevity. Rand recognized a third alternative: the moral values and virtues are essential constituents of the ultimate end that is a person’s life, and they owe their status as constituents to the causal contribution they make to the sustenance of this life. On her view, there are no values apart from an individual’s ultimate value of his own life, and a person’s life is made up of the values and activities by which he sustains himself." (Companion 134–135)
See also Allan Gotthelf's discussion (p. 91) on the use of the words "flourishing" and "eudaimonia" to describe what Rand sees as the ultimate end. I don't think it's wrong to use these words, but it can certainly be misleading, insofar as it can lead people to assimilate her more closely to the Aristotelian tradition than her texts bear out (not withstanding the profound similarities that there are between her and this tradition).
Darryl W. replies: Some very quick thoughts on this valuable post:
I agree that there is an egoistic analogue of consequentialism. But I would draw the distinction between that kind of egoism and Rand’s (and, more generally, between Rand’s view and consequentialism) somewhat differently.
Consequentialism is primarily a theory of the right, and I think Rawls’ characterization in A Theory of Justice of what were at that time usually called “teleological” theories (and are now called “consequentialist”) is apt as a characterization of consequentialism. (On another thread, there was discussion of the contrast between consequentialism and other theories that might be called “teleological” but not “consequentialist,” using the former term in a different way than Rawls did. I agree that there is such a distinction, and that it’s important. I’m restricting myself here only to consequentialist theories.)
On Rawls’s characterization, consequentialism holds that the good is prior to the right and that the right is what maximizes the good. Rawls went on to characterize deontological theories as those which deny one or both of these claims, and I think that’s a mistake—since it’s not the case that views denying one or both of these claims belong together in any narrower category than “moral theories” or “theories of the right.” But I do think that it should be considered a defining characteristic of consequentialist theories that they take the right to consist in the maximization of the good and take it that the good, in whatever sense matters for the theory of right, can be defined prior to and independently of the right.
Though it’s true that Rand’s view of welfare links welfare to an agent’s actions, it would be possible to have a consequentialist theory that did this also. For example, very simply, if not very plausibly, welfare could be understood as an agent’s active pursuit and achievement of desired ends. If one took this to have value in itself, one could define either an egoistic or an impartialistic form of consequentialism based on this account of welfare. On this view, the good would still be prior to the right, even though the agent’s welfare would not be independent of his actions.
(On an egoistic variant of this view, an argument for justice as a moral requirement would be along the following lines: that, e.g., repaying one’s debts was necessary as part of a process of actively pursuing and achieving one’s desired ends. The good consequences would not be seen as wholly independent of the just act, but the priority of the good would have been maintained, since you wouldn’t have needed to mention justice to conceive of the end by reference to which justice was evaluated as right or required. I’m not recommending this view, but just saying that it preserves the essential structure of consequentialism as far as I can see, whereas on Rand’s view nothing that avoids reference to moral norms will be adequate as an account of an individual’s welfare, since an individual’s welfare critically involves how he makes certain moral choices.)
As I see it, Rand’s view differs from consequentialism not primary in linking welfare with action, though that’s an indispensable part of her position, or in not separating right action from the values it achieves, but in denying the priority of the good over the right.
(Related to this, Rand denies that there is such a thing as “nonmoral value” by which to anchor the consequentialist evaluation of actions. In most forms of consequentialism, the sort of value on which action-evaluation is based is regarded as non-moral, although that’s not essential to consequentialism or to the thesis of the priority of the right.)
What differentiates Rand’s view from consequentialism is that her account of human good is, at the same time, an account of the right, or, more properly, of morality—of moral value and virtue. She doesn’t hold, with Kant, that the right is prior to the good, but that, at the most fundamental level, in characterizing human good and thus human welfare we are at the same delineating basic moral principles. Fundamentally, she sees human good as requiring certain kinds of basic choices, and it is in being confronted by the need to make these choices (e.g., between rationality and irrationality, or purpose or purposelessness) that we are confronted by distinctively “moral" issues.
I think that Greg’s brief characterization of Rand’s view adverts to, or at least leaves room for recognizing, this contrast between her view and consequentialism. I’m thinking specifically of his reference to rationality. On Rand’s view, rationality is a moral virtue, and an all-encompassing one, so to say that an individual’s welfare consists in the rational achievement of a certain kind of life is to say that morality is integral to one’s achievement of one’s welfare.
(Part of why Rand doesn’t hold that the right is prior to the good is that she holds a teleological view of the good. Delineating both goodness and rightness, values and virtues, is a teleological enterprise and, properly understood, the same enterprise. In saying that it’s a teleological enterprise, I mean very roughly that it involves exploring the structure of goal-directed action.)
On some views, rationality is a pre-moral concept to be understood in terms of consistency and/or informational adequacy, or what have you. A moral theory that built a rationality constraint into its conception of welfare, but conceived of rationality independently from morality, could still be a consequentialist view, if it also held that the right is maximization of welfare (either for the agent or for everyone).
So, to summarize, what seems crucial to me in differentiating Rand’s position from consequentialism (and—though this is for another time—from deontology) is her view of the relation between morality and individual welfare and not just her view of the relation between the latter and an agent’s action.